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Introduction and Executive Summary 
 
The Executive Committee convened the Task Force on 
Environmental Aspects of the NY State Constitution in January 
of 2017 with the following purpose: 
 
study and prepare a written report, to submit to 
the Section’s Executive Committee, regarding (1) 
environmental issues appropriate for 
consideration in any amendment to the New York 
Constitution, beyond the issues which the NYSBA 
House of Delegate has already determined, and 
(2) constitutional issues relevant to climate 
change, and (3) appropriate provisions for an 
environmental right in the State Constitution, 
and (4) any other environmental issues that the 
Task Force considers important for submission to 
the Section Executive CommitteeFalse1 
 
The Task Force has met, consulted, and prepared the Report 
and Recommendations that follow.  As described in greater 
detail and for the reasons provided, the Task Force recommends: 
 
(I) That no changes be made to Article XIV; and 
(II) Article I be amended to set forth an environmental 
right. 
 
The purpose of the Report is to inform and enrich 
understanding of environmental issues which may be considered 
at a Constitutional Convention (should one occur) or with 
respect to proposals to amend the Constitution through the 
legislative process. 
The New York State Bar Association supports a 
Constitutional Convention. If a convention is held, the Task 
 
*  The opinions expressed are those of the committee preparing this report and 
do not represent those of the New York State Bar Association unless and until 
they have been adopted by its House of Delegates or Executive Committee. 
1.  Memorandum from Nicholas A. Robinson to Lawrence P. Schnapf, 
Proposals for a Section Task Force on Environmental Aspects of the NY State 
Constitution (Jan. 27, 2017). 
3
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Force recommends as follows: 
 
Recommendation I 
 
No changes to Article XIV are needed or advisable. 
 
Some analyses of Article XIV2 have suggested tweaks 
designed to update and simplify the Article’s text without 
altering its substantive content and protections.  The Task Force 
examined two such suggestions for how the text of Article XIV 
could be improved (deletion of the “as now fixed by law” clause 
and repeal of Section 2, the Burd Amendment) and concluded in 
each case that no change is needed or advisable. The Task Force 
is also aware of proposals to amend Article XIV that might be 
raised at a Constitutional Convention and could have the effect 
of weakening the text.  The Task Force does not believe that 
textual amendment is necessary to improve Article XIV and 
further recognizes that a Constitutional Convention creates the 
risk that Article XIV could be weakened. 
 
(1) Evaluating the “as now fixed by law” clause 
 
Article XIV provides in Section 1, “The lands of the state, 
now owned or hereafter acquired, constituting the forest 
preserve as now fixed by law, shall be forever kept as wild forest 
lands.”3  The “as now fixed by law” clause is the key to preventing 
the Legislature from purporting to (re)define the Forest 
Preserve. The clause anchors the definition in time, in a way 
serving the “forever” part of the constitutional mandate. 
The Constitutional Convention debates of September 7 and 
8, 1894 make clear the purpose behind the phrase “as now fixed 
by law.”  The delegates knew they were “fixing” the definition of 
Forest Preserve in a statute not part of the Constitution and that 
the use of the phrase was intended to prevent the Legislature 
 
2.  Including the New York State Bar Association, Report and 
Recommendations Concerning the Conservation Article in the State 
Constitution (Article XIV) (approved by the House of Delegates November 5, 
2016). 
3.  N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, §1 (emphasis added). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/10
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from changing the definition by changing the statute.  On 
September 7, delegate David McClure, Chairman of the Special 
Committee on State Forest Preservation which had proposed the 
Forever Wild Clause explained that he inserted the words “as 
now fixed by law” in the original draft, saying he was doing so to 
prevent the Legislature from ever changing the statutory 
definition of the phrase in Laws of 1893, chapter 332: 
 
The object of inserting “as now fixed by law” is to 
prevent the Legislature from at any time limiting 
the extent of the forest preserves by providing 
that in a certain county which by the laws of the 
state is now a part of the forest preserves there 
should not be included within it, or in any way 
excepting, any part of the lands within that 
county. It was thought by the committee desirable 
to fix it so that as the law now constitutes the 
forest preserves it shall be understood to be 
referred to in the Constitution.4 
 
The “as now fixed by law” clause thus serves an important 
function and should be retained. 
 
(2) Evaluating Section 2, the Burd Amendment 
 
Section 2, the Burd Amendment, reserves up to three 
percent of the Forest Preserve “for the construction and 
maintenance of reservoirs for municipal water supply, and for 
the canals of the state.”5  The Burd Amendment is specifically 
limited to the construction and maintenance of reservoirs for 
municipal water supplies and for the supplying water to the 
canals of the State.  It does not authorize the use of Forest 
Preserve for water wells, nor does it authorize the flooding of 
Forest Preserve for flood control reservoirs or to address river 
level fluctuations.  It is very unlikely a municipality will propose 
 
4.  See, Robert C. Glennon, “Non-Forest Preserve: Inconsistent Use,” in 
GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON THE ADIRONDACK PARK IN THE TWENTY FIRST 
CENTURY, TECHNICAL REPORT, Vol 1, No. 5, at 76 n. 5. 
5.  N.Y. CONST., art. XIV, sec. 2. 
5
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a new water supply reservoir in the Forest Preserve because 
today’s New York State Health Department is very opposed to 
surface water reservoirs in the Forest Preserve as a source of 
drinking water and would be unlikely to issue a permit for same.  
It is even more unlikely that anyone would ever propose a new 
dam and reservoir for any canal system.  Section 2 thus 
expressly limits any prospective dam and water impoundment 
project and does so in a manner that renders it extremely 
unlikely that such a project would be pursued.  For those 
reasons, the Task Force concludes that Section 2 should not be 
amended or deleted. 
The Task Force also recognizes the value of the Section 4 
State Nature and Historical Preserve Trust which has been used 
by land conservationists to protect tens of thousands of acres of 
scenic and ecologically “unique” lands as part of the State 
Nature and Historical Preserve Trust created by Section 4.6  
Section 4 provides for State acquisition of lands for a “state 
nature and historical preserve” located outside of the Forest 
Preserve.7  The statutory authority for Article 45 of the 
Environmental Conservation Law is expressly predicated on 
Section 4 of Article XIV8 and Environmental Conservation Law 
§§ 45-0117 and 51-0703 give effect to this provision by creating 
a State Nature and Historical Preserve Trust to protect unique 
natural resources and features of State forests and wildlife 
management areas designated as “unique areas” to be included 
in the Trust. 
Therefore, the Task Force concludes that there is no need to 
update or amend the text of Article XIV.  The Task Force is 
further concerned that the following contemporary Adirondack 
legal controversies might be addressed by the delegates of a 
 
6.  The Task Forth further notes that Section 3 of Article XIV creates the 
legal basis for some 750,000 acres of state forest land and 250,000 acres of state 
wildlife management areas outside the bluelines of the Adirondack and 
Catskill Forest Preserve. While Section 3 notes that the strict limits of section 
1 of Article XIV do not apply to these lands, section 3 concludes with this strong 
legal protection for these valuable lands, declaring “that such lands shall not 
be leased, sold or exchanged, or be taken by any corporation, public or private.”  
N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.  Section 3 preserves these valuable lands all across 
the state from commercial exploitation or sale. 
7.  N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 4.   
8.  See ECL § 45-0101. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/10
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Constitutional Convention to the detriment of the “forever wild” 
character of the Forest Preserve: 
 
- A possible amendment approving an Adirondack Park 
network of road-like community connector snowmobile 
trails should the State lose the currently pending Protect 
the Adirondacks v. DEC case challenging the creation of 
such a snowmobile trail system; 
- An amendment to allow all-terrain vehicle use of the great 
network of existing and future snowmobile trails if 
climate change threatens the practicality of snowmobile 
use and its contribution to the economy of communities 
in the Adirondack Park; 
- a Closed Cabin Amendment redux, arising from current 
DEC proposals like the 5-acre “Unclassified” parcel to 
facilitate a dining and lodging hut-to-hut/yurt facility on 
the Forest Preserve lands of the Boreas Tract or other 
Forest Preserve lands on the 15 identified “hut to hut” 
trail routes in the Adirondack Park. 
 
Article XIV presently provides robust protection to the 
Forest Preserve.  Even small, well-intentioned changes to the 
text of Article XIV run the risk of occasioning unintended 
consequences and open the door to efforts to weaken Article XIV.  
The Task Force thus recommends that Article XIV should not be 
amended, changed or modified. 
 
Recommendation II 
 
Article I should articulate and provide for the protection 
of a right to clean and healthy environment. 
 
The Task Force supports the adoption of a constitutional 
right to a clean and healthful environment.  We propose that the 
right be embodied as a new Section 19 of Article I, which 
contains other bill of rights provisions such as free speech and 
equal protection.9  The beneficial operation of similar provisions 
 
9.  The Task Force recommends incorporation of an environmental right 
in Article I, as opposed to Article XIV, because such a right is appropriately 
7
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in other jurisdictions, the anticipated emergence of climate 
change-related environmental challenges unprecedented in 
their severity and complexity, and the limited scope of New 
York’s  existing Conservation Bill of Rights augur in favor of the 
adoption of such a right. 
Several states and nations have already adopted 
constitutional environmental rights10 and efforts are underway 
to secure the recognition of environmental rights around the 
world.11  In March 2017, the New York State Assembly passed 
Assembly Bill 6279 which would amend Article I of the 
Constitution by adding: “Each person shall have a right to clean 
air and water, and a healthful environment.”12  Most notably in 
the United States, three states—Pennsylvania, Montana and 
Hawaii—have enacted constitutional provisions to protect 
environmental values, which the courts of those states have 
ruled to be enforceable by citizens.  In these jurisdictions, 
constitutional environmental rights provisions have proven to be 
 
viewed as on par with the other important rights protected in Article I.  
Additionally, any effort to amend Section 4 of Article XIV to include an 
environmental right might invite opponents to attempt to delete or weaken 
Section 5 of Article XIV, its vitally important citizens suit provision.  Section 5 
is critical, especially to give citizens and advocacy groups the right to sue to 
protect the “forever wild” character of the Forest Preserve.  Existing Article 
XIV effectively protects the Forest Preserve in the Adirondack and Catskill 
State Parks. That provision, part of the State Constitution since 1894, is vital 
to the future of those areas of our State so important environmentally and for 
tourism and recreation.  It should be maintained in its integrity. 
10.  See Environment and Natural Resource Provisions in State 
Constitutions, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES AND ENVTL. L. 73 (2002) (surveying state 
constitutional provisions); James R. May & Erin Daley, Constitutional 
Environmental Rights Worldwide, in PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 329 (2011).  
11.  Delaware Riverkeeper, for example, has a new initiative, For the 
Generations, “to pursue and secure constitutional protection of environmental 
rights in states across the nations.”  Delaware Riverkeeper, For the 
Generations, available at http://www.delawareriverkeeper.org/ongoing-
issues/generations (last visited Aug. 8, 2017).  Additionally, the draft Global 
Pact for the Environment provides in Article I, “Every person has the right to 
live in an ecologically sound environment adequate for their health, well-being, 
dignity, culture and fulfilment.”  Preliminary Draft Global Pact for the 
Environment (June 24, 2017), available at 
https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/draft-project-of-the-
global-pact-for-the-environment.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2017).   
12.   While we also recommend adoption of a constitutional environmental 
right in Article 1, the text that we propose differs in some respects for the 
reasons described infra. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/10
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environmentally protective, a useful means to require 
consideration of the interests of future generations, and have not 
unduly displaced legislative prerogative. 
Additionally, emerging environmental threats present 
unprecedented societal challenges.  Vexing environmental 
problems have emerged within the scope of traditional 
regulation of air and water quality, such as increased 
recognition of connections between pollution and asthma rates, 
awareness of local air pollution hot spots, and the detection of 
widespread contamination of drinking water with a range of 
pollutants (such as pharmaceuticals, PFOAs and 1,4 dioxane).  
More importantly, however, climate change presents challenges 
that have no historical analog in their scope and complexity and 
will require a long-term, proactive, and thoughtful 
governmental response.13 
Finally, as presently interpreted, the existing Conservation 
Bill of Rights in Article XIV Section 4 does not function as a 
robust assertion of environmental right that can help New York 
meet these unprecedented challenges.  The existing 
Conservation Bill of Rights in Article XIV, section 4, provides in 
relevant part: 
 
The policy of the state shall be to conserve and 
protect its natural resources and scenic beauty 
and encourage the development and improvement 
of its agricultural lands for the production of food 
and other agricultural products. The legislature, 
in implementing this policy, shall include 
adequate provision for the abatement of air and 
water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary 
noise, the protection of agricultural lands, 
wetlands and shorelines, and the development 
and regulation of water resources. 
 
 
13.  For a discussion of how the public trust doctrine can guide adaptation 
to climate change in the context of water resources, see Robin Kundis Craig, 
Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State Common-Law Public 
Trust Doctrines, 34 VERMONT L. REV. 781 (2009) (describing how state public 
trust doctrines can support adaptive management for water resources in the 
context of climate change).  
9
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The Conservation Bill of Rights was held in Leland v. Moran 
to afford no “constitutionally protected property right” 
enforceable in the courts and its substantive charge is both 
limited in scope and generally understood to be fulfilled by 
existing environmental statutes.14 
The analysis that follows (1) undertakes a close examination 
of the most serious concern expressed about the adoption of a 
self-executing constitutional environmental right, namely that 
it will displace legislative and executive authority with in 
environmental policymaking; and (2) evaluates different 
constructions and orientations of a constitutional environmental 
right.  This analysis concludes that it is unlikely that adoption 
of a self-executing environmental right in New York would 
override basic principles of judicial deference to legislative and 
executive actions.  It also recommends that the right be oriented 
around the concept of a governmental trust duty enforceable 
directly by citizens in actions against the government and that 
it expressly reference the interests of future generations and 
incorporate ecological principles. 
 
(1) Assessing the implications of a self-executing right 
 
The potential to shift policymaking authority from the 
legislature to the judiciary is often identified as a chief reason 
not to constitutionalize environmental rights or duties.  For a 
variety of reasons, legislatures may be more institutionally 
suited to develop environmental policy.15  Judicial intervention 
may, however, be warranted when the legislative process proves 
inadequate to protect core environmental values,16 which is 
 
14.  Leland v. Moran, 235 F.Supp.2d 153, 169 (N.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 80 
Fed. Appx. 133, 2003 WL 22533185 (2d Cir. 2003). 
15.  See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and 
State Constitutions: The Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS 
L.J. 863, 891-899 (1996) (explaining various reasons why legislatures are a 
preferred venue for developing environmental policy, including that judicial 
intervention can reduce incentives for legislative action, legislatures are in a 
better position to decide environmental tradeoffs which present largely 
political questions, legislatures are better equipped to engage in fact-finding).   
16.  See generally Jeffrey Omar Usman, Good Enough for Government 
Work: The Interpretation of Positive Constitutional Rights in State 
Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1459, 1515-16 (2010) (describing the argument 
that even the expression of general constitutional principles should warrant 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/10
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particularly likely to occur when, for example, seeking to protect 
the interests of future generations17; additionally, a shift of 
authority to the judiciary is arguably less troubling from the 
perspective of democratic representation at the state, as 
compared to the federal level.18  And many lament that it is 
difficult for public environmental rights and concerns to be 
redressed in New York’s courts because New York State 
environmental statutes lack the citizen-suit provisions found in 
the major federal environmental statutes.19  We note the 
existence of long-running debate about the optimal role for the 
judiciary in environmental policy and that it undergirds concern 
about constitutionalizing environmental rights. 
To inform assessment of the advisability of incorporating a 
more robust (self-executing) environmental right in the New 
York State Constitution, it is thus useful to consider whether 
and to what extent adopting such a right would, in fact or 
potential, shift environmental policymaking to the judiciary.  
The analysis that follows assesses the impact that robust, self-
executing constitutional environmental rights have had on the 
distribution of judicial and legislative authority in those states 
where such a right or duty is recognized and seeks to envision 
how such a right might affect judicial authority in New York. 
Ultimately, while a robust, self-executing constitutional 
environmental right would allow for increased judicial 
participation in significant environmental disputes, it is 
unlikely that such participation would unduly encroach on the 
core role of the legislature.  States that recognize a robust, self-
 
judicial enforcement in certain circumstances).   
17.  Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Constitutionalizing the Environment: The 
History and Future of Montana’s Environmental Provisions, 64 MONT. L. REV. 
157, 198 (2003) (positing that the “normative argument for constitutional 
intervention is stronger” with respect to “[e]nvironmental issues that involve 
future generations, such as the depletion of exhaustible resources, the 
endangerment of species, global climate change, and the use of long-lived 
toxics.”). 
18.  State court judges are, for example, more accountable to the 
electorate and closer to state culture and legal norms and state constitutions 
can be more easily amended (thereby providing a more feasible means for the 
citizenry to override judicial constitutional interpretations with which it 
disagrees).  Usman, supra note 16, at 1524. 
19.  See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(interpreting federal citizen suit provisions to allow citizens to be “welcomed 
participants in the vindication of environmental interests.”). 
11
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executing constitutional environmental right have not 
experienced a radical or undesirable shift of environmental 
policymaking authority to the judiciary.  In Montana, judicial 
intervention has been relatively limited and reserved for cases 
presenting unusual and compelling facts.  In Hawai’i, judicial 
intervention to enforce constitutional environmental rights has 
been more common and involved, but is perhaps best 
characterized as requiring dialogue about and attentiveness to 
environmental values.  And in Pennsylvania, while the judiciary 
has twice invoked constitutional environmental rights to strike 
down State statutes, both cases involve disputes about the 
appropriate development of the State’s natural gas reserves 
through fracking, a factual situation that closely parallels the 
concerns about environmental damage associated with 
historical exploitation of Pennsylvania’s natural resources that 
motivated the adoption of its Environmental Rights 
Amendment. 
Additionally, in terms of predicting how New York courts 
might interpret and apply a similar right, it is useful to note that 
when New York courts have interpreted self-executing positive 
constitutional rights addressed to other subjects (such as 
poverty), they have done so in a manner that largely preserves 
legislative prerogative.  Finally, the text of the environmental 
right that we recommend for New York is oriented and phrased 
so as to provide the citizens of New York with a judicial 
backstop—a means to challenge actions affecting integral 
environmental values while largely preserving existing 
mechanisms of environmental policymaking and protection. 
 
Positive constitutional environmental rights and 
judicial authority 
 
Environmental constitutional rights20 are typically 
 
20.  Environmental rights can be expressed in a variety of ways in state 
constitutions and typically involve the assertion of an affirmative, individual 
right to a clean and healthy environment (or similar).  Many state constitutions 
also impose trust duties. Most notably, the Hawai’i and Pennsylvania 
constitutions house both affirmative grants of environmental rights provisions 
and declare public trust duties and in both states it is the public trust duties 
that have proved particularly important in key decisions. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/10
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articulated as positive (second-generation or substantive) 
rights.21 The enforcement of positive rights can require courts 
not only to prevent or stop government action (as would be 
demanded in the enforcement of negative rights), but further to 
compel legislative action and thus “immerse[ ] courts more 
deeply within the affairs of the executive and legislative 
branches” and raise separation of powers concerns.22  A review 
of state judicial interpretation of positive state constitutional 
rights reveals that courts often deploy doctrines or approaches 
(political question, finding that an affirmative right is not self-
executing, recognizing that the right imposes an affirmative 
duty on the legislature but giving the legislature broad 
discretion in defining the scope of the duty, narrowly 
interpreting the scope of environmental rights provisions, 
declining to hear cases on procedural grounds (such as standing 
or ripeness)) that largely preserve the traditional distribution of 
authority between the judiciary and the legislature and avoid 
judicial policymaking.23  These approaches can be seen in New 
York, where at least one court has held that Section 4, the 
existing Conservation Bill of Rights, affords no constitutionally-
protected property right enforceable by courts (effectively 
treating it as non-self-executing)24; and, in the context of 
interpreting Article XVIII, Section 1 (imposing an affirmative 
obligation to help the needy), courts have largely deferred to the 
 
21.  For a discussion of the distinction between positive and negative 
constitutional rights, see Usman, supra note 16, at 1462-1464. 
22.  Id. at 1495. 
23.  Usman, supra note 16, at 1497-1506; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., 
Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History and Future of Montana’s 
Environmental Provisions, supra note 17, at 163-65 (2003); Thompson, 
Environmental Policy, supra note 15, at 896-97. 
24.  Leland v. Moran, 235 F.Supp.2d 153, 169 (N.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 80 
Fed. Appx. 133, 2003 WL 22533185 (2d Cir. 2003).  Of note, it is also relatively 
difficult to demonstrate standing in New York in many environmental public 
interest cases.  Albert K. Butzel; Ned Thimmayya, The Tyranny of Plastics: 
How Society of Plastics, Inc. v. County of Suffolk Prevents New Yorkers from 
Protecting Their Environment and How They Could Be Liberated from Its 
Unreasonable Standing Requirements, 32 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) 
(lamenting the stringency of standing requirements under SEQRA and 
documenting that “numerous other states have developed standing doctrines 
that more capably match the purposes of their environmental protection acts 
and address the ecological complexities of environmental harms yet also 
prevent frivolous complaints from disrupting judicial efficiency”). 
13
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legislature regarding the adequacy of benefits.25 
In some circumstances, however, courts have applied strict 
scrutiny to state constitutional affirmative rights (see discussion 
of application of Montana’s environmental right, supra) or 
become deeply enmeshed in defining and overseeing the 
implementation of policy necessary to satisfy the state 
constitutional affirmative right (for example, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s involvement in school finance litigation).26  
Both of these approaches to interpreting affirmative rights in 
state constitutions (strict scrutiny and active judicial 
management) can result in greater judicial policymaking at the 
expense of legislative prerogative. 
To better understand the potential for a constitutional 
environmental right to give rise to increased policymaking on 
the environmental by the judiciary, a short review follows of the 
experience in the three states with positive constitutional 
environmental rights where those rights have been treated as 
self-executing and have not been otherwise unduly limited 
through court interpretation, Hawai’i, Montana and 
Pennsylvania.27 
 
 
 
25.  Usman, supra note 16, at 1504-05; Sylvia Ewald, Note, State Court 
Adjudication of Environmental Rights: Lessons from the Adjudication of the 
Right to Education and the Right to Welfare, 36 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 413, 445-
47 (2011) (“New York courts have taken a relatively conservative approach to 
welfare rights, and are highly deferential to the legislature in this area.”).  
26.  Usman, supra note 16, at 1508-11. 
27.  Of note, six state constitutions articulate environmental rights, 
Sylvia Ewald, Note, State Court Adjudication of Environmental Rights: 
Lessons from the Adjudication of the Right to Education and the Right to 
Welfare, 36 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 413, 420 (2011), although many more address 
environmental matters in some fashion (including through the identification 
of government trust duties).  Of the state constitutions articulating 
environmental rights, two environmental rights provisions are not self-
executing as they textually require legislative action (Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island).  Id. at 423.  Another state environmental right provision (Illinois) is 
explicitly self-executing, but has been interpreted primarily as a means to 
demonstrate standing in claims based upon other state laws.  Id. at 426-29.  
See also People v. Pollution Control Bd., 129 Ill. App. 3d 958, 964, 473 N.E.2d 
452, 456 (1984) (holding that the intent of the Illinois constitutional 
environmental rights provision was merely “to remove the special injury 
requirement for standing” and thus functions only “to ensure standing, not to 
create substantive causes of action.”). 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/10
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Hawai’i 
 
Article XI, Section 1 of the Hawai’i Constitution provides: 
 
For the benefit of present and future generations, 
the State and its political subdivisions shall 
conserve and protect Hawai’i’s natural beauty and 
all natural resources, including land, water, air, 
minerals and energy sources, and shall promote 
the development and utilization of these resources 
in a manner consistent with their conservation 
and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the 
State. All public natural resources are held in 
trust by the State for the benefit of the people.28 
 
Article XI, Section 9 of the Hawai’i Constitution provides: 
 
Each person has the right to a clean and healthful 
environment, as defined by laws relating to 
environmental quality, including control of 
pollution and conservation, protection and 
enhancement of natural resources. Any person 
may enforce this right against any party, public or 
private, through appropriate legal proceedings, 
subject to reasonable limitations and regulation 
as provided by law.29 
 
The trust duty set forth in Article XI, Section 1 coexists with 
and is defined with reference to common law public trust 
principles.  While it is difficult to discern precisely what the 
constitutional expression of the trust duty adds to underlying 
common law public trust doctrine, Hawai’ian courts have been 
clear that the constitutional expression strengthens the trust 
duty, observing that through the “constitutional affirmation of a 
trust duty the people of this state have elevated the public trust 
doctrine to the level of a constitutional mandate.”30  Courts 
 
28.  HRS Const. Art. XI, § 1. 
29.  HRS Const. Art. XI, § 9. 
30.  In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Haw. 97, 131, 9 P.3d 409, 
15
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invoking Section 1 have further suggested that judicial review is 
more searching when public trust duties are involved, noting 
that “while agency decisions affecting public trust resources 
carry a presumption of validity,” ultimately “[a]s with other 
state constitutional guarantees, the ultimate authority to 
interpret and defend the public trust in Hawai’i rests with the 
courts of this state.”31  In the context of water resources (most 
closely aligned with traditional, common law understandings of 
the public trust doctrine), Hawai’ian courts have actively 
defined32 and policed the scope of public trust duties, making 
clear that the public trust doctrine has “independent vitality,” to 
“inform the [State Water] Code’s interpretation, define its 
permissible ‘outer limits,’ and justify its existence.”33 
While the Section 1 public trust duty has been developed 
primarily with regard to water resources, it has also been held 
to encompass lands in the public domain.34  In Mauna Kea, the 
Supreme Court of Hawai’i held that the Board of Land and 
Natural Resources had violated, inter alia, Article XI, Section 1 
of the Hawai’i Constitution as a matter of law by deciding the 
merits of an application for a permit for a proposed astronomy 
observatory on Mauna Kea before conducting a contested case 
hearing in which the public trust doctrine, and the obligations it 
imposes on the State, could have been duly considered.35  The 
court held that Mauna Kea was within the public trust and that 
“an agency of the State must perform its statutory function in a 
manner that fulfills the State’s affirmative constitutional 
obligations,” namely “fashion procedures that are 
commensurate to the constitutional stature of the rights 
involved.”36  Notably, however, the court’s decision did not rest 
 
443 (2000).   
31.  In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Haw. 97, 143, 9 P.3d 409, 
455 (2000). 
32.  In re Waiola O Molokai, Inc., 103 Haw. 401, 429, 83 P.3d 664, 692 
(2004) (exploring the scope of public trust duties relating to water resources). 
33.  In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Haw. 97, 133, 9 P.3d 409, 
445 (2000). 
34.  Morimoto v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res., 113 P.3d 172 (Haw. 2005) 
(suggesting in dicta that the public trust could apply to biodiversity). 
35.  Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res., 136 Haw. 376, 
409, 363 P.3d 224, 257 (2015). 
36.  Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res., 136 Haw. 376, 
414, 363 P.3d 224, 262 (2015). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/10
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solely on the Section 1 trust duty; the court also held that 
issuance of the permit before a contested case hearing violated 
the due process rights of parties with standing to assert Native 
Hawaiian traditional and customary rights. 
Hawai’i’s constitution also sets forth the right to a clean and 
healthful environment in Article XI, Section 9.  This 
constitutional right was long referenced by Hawaiian courts 
primarily to support liberalized standing.  However, in Ala Loop 
Homeowners, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that article XI, 
Section 9 is self-executing and provides an implied private right 
of action to enforce State laws relating to environmental 
quality.37  The court thus held that a neighborhood association 
had a private right of action to seek to enforce land use statutes 
against a charter school.  In its decision, the court noted the 
intent of the framers at the 1978 Constitutional Convention to 
increase public involvement: 
 
Your Committee believes that this important 
right deserves enforcement and has removed the 
standing to sue barriers, which often delay or 
frustrate resolutions on the merits of actions or 
proposals, and provides that individuals may 
directly sue public and private violators of 
statutes, ordinances and administrative rules 
relating to environmental quality. The proposal 
adds no new duties but does add potential 
enforcers.38 
 
Notably, although Ala Loop Homeowners would seem to 
invite suits to enforce state environmental laws, few 
environmental decisions have relied on Ala Loop Homeowners in 
the intervening seven years.  Moreover, the court also signaled 
deference to the legislature in defining the scope of the 
constitutional environmental right, observing that Article XI, 
Section 9 “recognizes a substantive right ‘to a clean and 
 
37.  Cty. of Hawaii v. Ala Loop Homeowners, 123 Haw. 391, 417, 235 P.3d 
1103, 1129, 1134 (2010). 
38.  Cty. of Hawaii v. Ala Loop Homeowners, 123 Haw. 391, 414, 235 P.3d 
1103, 1125-26 (2010) (citing to Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 77, in 1 Proceedings of 
the Constitutional Convention of 1978, at 689–690 (1980)). 
17
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healthful environment,’ with the content of that right to be 
established not by judicial decisions but rather ‘as defined by 
laws relating to environmental quality.’”39 
In Hawai’i, then, the constitutional assertion of a public 
trust duty appears to have resulted in significant judicial 
oversight, particularly with regard to the development of policy 
governing water resources (a subject matter with respect to 
which there is often some judicial involvement even absent a 
constitutional provision as a result of the “amphibious” scope of 
the common law public trust doctrine).  Judicial oversight is both 
substantive (requiring, for example, that intergenerational 
interests be considered) and procedural (compelling procedures 
sufficient to assure consideration of public trust values).  
Judicial intervention does not, however, approach the level of 
judicial management sometimes seen in the context of other 
state constitutional positive rights, such as education or 
assistance to the needy.  The judiciary appears to be adding its 
voice to a dialogue with agencies and the legislature about 
appropriate considerations and processes in environmental 
policy—a level of judicial involvement with which even many 
wary of undue judicial aggrandizement are likely comfortable. 
The constitutional enshrinement of an environmental right, 
while interpreted to be self-executing and to provide a right of 
action to enforce environmental laws, has not yet resulted in 
notable judicial oversight of environmental policy. 
 
Montana 
 
Montana’s constitution provides in relevant part: 
 
All persons are born free and have certain 
inalienable rights. They include the right to a 
clean and healthful environment . . . .40 
 
* * * 
 
39.  Cty. of Hawaii v. Ala Loop Homeowners, 123 Haw. 391, 409, 235 P.3d 
1103, 1121 (2010) (citing to Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 77, in 1 Proceedings of the 
Constitutional Convention of Hawai’i of 1978, at 689). 
40.  Mont. Const. art. II, § 3. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/10
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(1)    The state and each person shall maintain and 
improve a clean and healthful environment in 
Montana for present and future generations. 
(2) The legislature shall provide for the 
administration and enforcement of this duty. 
(3) The legislature shall provide adequate 
remedies for the protection of the environmental 
life support system from degradation and provide 
adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable 
depletion and degradation of natural resources.41 
 
For many years, the Montana Supreme Court referenced 
the constitutional environmental provisions to uphold State 
action, but declined to rely on those provisions to “challenge 
actions harming the environment.”42  However, in 1999, the 
Montana Supreme Court held that an amendment to Montana’s 
Water Quality Act which excluded certain activities from review 
under the Act’s nondegradation policy, thereby allowing the 
discharge of arsenic-containing water without environmental 
review, implicated the right to a clean and healthful 
environment, and could survive only after the application of 
strict scrutiny on remand.43  The Montana Supreme Court found 
that the right to a “clean and healthful” environment is a 
fundamental right and that “any statute or rule which 
implicates that right must be strictly scrutinized and can only 
survive strict scrutiny if the State establishes a compelling state 
interest and that its action is closely tailored to effectuate that 
interest and is the least onerous path that can be taken to 
achieve the State’s objective.”44  Two years later, the Montana 
Supreme Court applied this holding to private actions, relying 
on the constitutional provisions to invalidate a private 
contractual provision that would have required drilling a well 
through a contaminated aquifer, potentially spreading the 
contamination.45 
 
41.  Mont. Const. art. IX, § 1. 
42.  Thompson, Constitutionalizing the Environment, supra note 17, at 
167. 
43.  MEIC v. DEQ, 296 Mont. 207, 231 (1999). 
44.  MEID v. DEQ, 296 Mont. 207, 225 (1999). 
45.  Cape-France Enterprises v. Estate of Peed, 305 Mont. 513 (2001). 
19
TASK FORCE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/17  10:12 PM 
2017 TASK FORCE REPORT 201 
By invoking strict scrutiny and extending the reach of the 
constitutional provisions to private actions, these cases would 
appear to have significant potential to increase judicial 
policymaking in the environmental realm.  The cases, however, 
have not prompted a flood of litigation or a radical redistribution 
of policymaking to the judiciary.  Few discovered cases have 
successfully relied on this precedent and, while it is too early to 
know how case law will evolve, to date the most enduring 
principle to have emerged is that legislative exemptions to 
environmental statutes will be subject to close scrutiny.  Indeed, 
the Montana Supreme Court “has begun to demarcate the limits 
of the MEIC holding” in a manner that “suggests that the court 
will be deferential to state and local governments” and “will 
continue to give deference to the interpretations of 
administrative agencies.”46  In 2012, for example, the Montana 
Supreme Court limited the scope of its holding that the 
environmental right is fundamental, subjecting a statute 
deferring environmental review for a coal strip mining operation 
until the permitting stage to only rational basis review.  The 
Court’s reasoning was that 
 
the leases themselves do not allow for any 
degradation of the environment, conferring only 
the exclusive right to apply for State permits, and 
because they specifically require full 
environmental review and full compliance with 
applicable State environmental laws, the act of 
issuing the leases did not impact or implicate the 
right to a clean and healthful environment in 
Article II, Section 3 of the Montana 
Constitution.47 
 
Nonetheless, in the words of one scholar, “[t]he Montana 
 
46.  Ewald, Note, supra note 27, at 432-33.  See generally John D. 
Echeverria, State Judicial Elections and Environmental Law: Case Studies of 
Montana, North Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 363, 
376 (2015) (observing that “in the last several years, environmental advocates 
have suffered several important losses in the Supreme Court, suggesting a 
shift in attitudes on the Court toward environmental cases.”). 
47.  N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Montana Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 2012 
MT 234, ¶ 19, 366 Mont. 399, 406, 288 P.3d 169, 174 (2012). 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/10
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court’s powerful interpretation of the constitutional right to a 
clean and healthful environment . . . affects agency decisions, 
thwarts legislative efforts to give polluters and developers 
statutory breaks from environmental laws, and infuses public 
debate on environmental issues.”48 
 
Pennsylvania 
 
Article I, Section 27 of Pennsylvania’s constitution, the 
Environmental Rights Amendment, provides: 
 
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, 
and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, 
historic and esthetic values of the environment.  
Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the 
common property of all the people, including 
generations yet to come.  As trustee of these 
resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and 
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.49 
 
Section 27 is located in Article I, the Pennsylvania’s 
Declaration of Rights, which also provides for religious freedom, 
freedom of speech, and protection from unreasonable search and 
seizure.50  Section 25 declares that rights set forth in Article I 
are “excepted out of the general powers of government and shall 
forever remain inviolate.”51 
Early Pennsylvania cases interpreted Section 27 as a grant 
of power to the government (as opposed to a limitation upon it) 
and required only that government decisions challenged as 
violating Section 27 satisfy a three-part balancing test largely 
divorced from the Section’s text (the Payne test).52  Courts also 
 
48.  Jack R. Tuholske, U.S. State Constitutions and Environmental 
Protection: Diamonds in the Rough, 21 Widener L. Rev. 239, 245 (2015). 
49.  Pa. Const. art. I, § 27. 
50.  Pa. Const. art. I, §§ 3, 7, 8. 
51.  Pa. Const. art. I, § 25. 
52.  Commonwealth v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 
588, 594 (Pa. 1973); Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 97 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), 
aff’d, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976).  See also Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a 
Constitutional Public Trust, 45 ENVTL. L. 463, 473-78 (2015) (summarizing pre-
21
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came to understand the section to not be self-executing.53  So 
construed, Section 27 had little practical effect. 
In 2013, in Robinson Township, a plurality of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court invoked Section 27, in particular 
its trust provisions, to strike down as unconstitutional a State 
statute (Act 13) that amended the 1969 Oil and Gas Act to 
impose a regulatory structure for unconventional gas 
development, including inter alia, by overriding local 
ordinances.54  In deciding that Act 13 violated the Section 27 
(primarily its trust clause), the plurality clarified that because 
Section 27 appears in Article I it imposes a limit on government 
power and that the right is self-executing.55 
In Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. 
Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, this time in a 
majority decision, expanded on Robinson Township, striking 
down legislation that allowed royalties from oil and gas drilling 
to be used for non-environmental (general) purposes with 
consideration of trust duties.56  Pennsylvania Environmental 
Defense Foundation built on Robinsons Township in several 
important ways, including by expressly overruling the 
deferential Payne test for assessing violations of the 
Environmental Rights Amendment and holding that private 
trust law principles are to be used to interpret the scope of the 
Commonwealth’s trust duty.  The majority invoked private trust 
law and reasoned that the proceeds from the sale of trust assets 
become part of the corpus of the trust and must be managed 
consistent with trust purposes; it thus held that the 
Commonwealth had violated its fiduciary duties in statutes 
directing the use of trust proceeds for general purposes without 
consideration of trust purposes. 
It is too early to fully appreciate whether and how a 
reinvigorated Section 27 might shape Pennsylvania law.  One 
expert scholar (writing before Pennsyvlania Environmental 
 
Robinson Township Pennsylvania cases interpreting Section 27).   
53.  Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust, 
supra note 52, at 475 (describing the evolution of Pennsylvania caselaw 
regarding whether Section 27 is self-executing). 
54.  Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013). 
55.  Id. at 948, 964-65 & n. 52. 
56.  161 A.3d 911 (June 20, 2017). 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/10
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Defense Foundation was decided) concluded that most post-
Robinson Township cases “are more about filling gaps and 
repairing inadequacies in the existing environmental regulatory 
system than they are about overturning that system and 
replacing it with something else.  While public constitutional 
rights undergird the entire regulatory system, they are likely to 
be applied directly in only a relatively small percentage of 
cases.”57 
While at first blush Pennsylvania Environmental Defense 
Foundation may seem like use of a constitutionalized 
environmental right for precisely the type of judicial 
aggrandizement feared by many, two points bear noting that 
should temper this concern.  First, both occasions on which the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has struck down legislation using 
the Environmental Rights Amendment have involved a factual 
situation (rapid, economically-motivated exploitation of a 
natural resource) that closely mirrors the concerns that 
animated adoption of the Environmental Rights Amendment 
(such as the environmental harms from timbering and coal 
mining).58  Faced with the rapid scale up of fracking to exploit 
Pennsylvania’s natural gas resources, the Environmental Rights 
Amendment can thus be viewed as functioning as a judicial 
backstop, providing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court with a 
means to strike down State laws that in its view went too far in 
favoring the short-term economic needs of the present 
generation over conservation of the underlying natural resource 
for current and future Pennsylvanians.  Additionally, 
Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation turns on the 
majority’s decision to invoke and apply technical aspects of 
private trust law. 
We are doubtful about the propriety of applying technical 
aspects of private trust law to a constitutionally-expressed 
environmental public trust right and recommend that the 
drafting and legislative history accompanying the adoption of an 
environmental right in New York should indicate that it is 
 
57.  Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust, 
supra note 52, at 514. 
58.  Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 960-63 (Pa. 2013); see 
also Penn. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911 (June 20, 2017). 
23
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grounded in the traditional public trust doctrine.59 
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
The more specific and detailed the constitutional right, the 
more readily we can rely upon strong and consistent judicial 
intervention in its defense without much risk of judicial 
aggrandizement.60  The Forever Wild provision in the New York 
State Constitution presently functions in this fashion, with 
courts regularly enforcing its clear constitutional command.61  
However, the defining environmental problems and goals of our 
generation and the next—including most notably climate change 
and sustainability—are so wide-ranging and complex in their 
causes, manifestation, and needed policy response (most of 
which are difficulty to anticipate) that that they cannot be 
captured in a neatly defined constitutional command the 
enforcement of which obviates the need for judicial 
interpretation and (possibly) more engaged judicial 
involvement.  These issues are nonetheless of central—
constitutional—import. 
Scholars identify a number of potential benefits of 
constitutionalizing public rights.  Because constitutional rights 
“trump inconsistent statutes and regulations” they “create a 
legal bulwark against incursion by the legislative or executive 
branches.”62  From a federalism perspective, some have 
 
59.  Penn. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 943 (June 
20, 2017) (Baer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Environmental Rights 
Amendment should be interpreted using the principles of the public trust 
doctrine as opposed to “precepts of private trust law”). 
60.  Usman, supra note 16, at 1516-17 (describing such provisions as 
“highly specific detailed affirmative rights provisions” and noting that 
“[r]igorous [judicial] enforcement of highly specific affirmative rights 
provisions is warranted.”). 
61.  As stated supra, we do not recommend tinkering with the language 
of Article XIV.  In light of the large body of case law interpreting the Forever 
Wild provision (and the extent to which it is indexed to the precise language of 
that provision), the great benefit it provides, and the potential for efforts to 
weaken to same (or simply cause inadvertent diminution), should a 
Constitutional Convention occur, we would recommend that delegates not 
touch or amend Article XIV in any respect. 
62.  John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public 
Trust, supra note 52, at 471-72. 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss1/10
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theorized that “the identification and enforcement of state 
constitutional rights can serve as a mechanism by which state 
governments can resist and, to a degree, counteract abusive 
exercises of national power.”63  Constitutionalized public rights 
are also more permanent because it is harder to amend a 
constitution than to alter statutes or regulations.64  And some 
posit that “because of their enduring nature and their higher 
legal status, public rights of the kind embodied in a bill of rights 
tend to more easily become part of the broader public discourse 
and public values over the long term than provisions in statutes 
or regulations,” thereby “foster[ing] the values they embody.”65 
While conceding that a robust, self-executing environmental 
right (and/or trust duty) carries with it the possibility of an 
expansion of judicial authority, experience gleaned from three 
other States and New York’s application of other affirmative 
constitutional rights suggests that there is little risk, in 
particular in New York, that this will unduly displace legislative 
prerogative.  In the words of one scholar, “courts have seldom 
invoked substantive environmental provisions to constrain or 
dictate state policy except in ‘transition periods,’ when some or 
all of the political branches of state government have lagged 
behind public opinion on an important issue.”66  And even where, 
as in Hawai’i, courts have interpreted constitutional 
environmental rights and duties in a more expansive fashion, 
the result has been judicial insistence upon consideration of and 
respect for core, constitutional environmental values, such as a 
recognition of the interests of future generations. 
 
(2) Orientation and wording of a constitutional 
environmental right 
 
There is great variation in the wording of constitutional 
 
63.  James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to 
National Power: Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. 
L. J. 1003, 1004 (2003).  
64.  Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust, 
supra note 52, at 471-72. 
65.  Id. 
66.  Thompson, Environmental Policy and State Constitutions, supra note 
15, at 865. 
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environmental rights provisions, with constitutional texts 
ranging from relatively bare assertions of a right to a healthy 
environment to detailed descriptions of the content of the 
environmental right.67  Having reviewed many articulations of 
constitutional environmental rights, examined how they have 
functioned (in particular in state constitutions), and considered 
the specific needs of New York, the Task Force believes that the 
constitutional text that establishes a constitutional right to a 
healthy environment should explain that a healthy environment 
requires the conservation and protection of our natural 
resources, clarify that natural resources necessary to a healthy 
environment belong to the people in common, and make clear 
that the State has the duty to protect these natural resources.  
The constitutional text should provide guidance for 
understanding the meaning of the right to a healthy 
environment by (a) describing it with reference to ecosystems 
and the services that they provide; (b) making clear that the 
right is held by and associated duties owed to future generations; 
and (c) explaining that the natural resources that support a 
healthy environment constitute a public trust.  It should also 
clarify the government’s duty to conserve and protect the public 
natural resources held in trust for the public and provide a 
mechanism for New Yorkers (citizens, through application to the 
judiciary) to require that the government meet its duty. 
Specifically, the Task Force recommends that a 
constitutional environmental right for New York should: 
 
• define the right to a healthy environment to include inter 
alia resilient and diverse ecosystems; 
• clarify that the public natural resources of New York 
 
67. E.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR, Oct. 20, 2008, art. 
413 (“The State shall promote energy efficiency, the development and use of 
environmentally clean and healthy practices and technologies, as well as 
diversified and low-impact renewable sources of energy that do not jeopardize 
food sovereignty, the ecological balance of the ecosystems or the right to 
water.”); art. 414 (“The State shall adopt adequate and cross-cutting measures 
for the mitigation of climate change, by limiting greenhouse gas emissions, 
deforestation, and air pollution; it shall take measures for the conservation of 
the forests and vegetation; and it shall protect the population at risk.”), 
available from 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html. 
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furnish the fundaments of a healthy environment and are 
held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people, 
including future generations; 
• assert the State’s duty to conserve and protect New York’s 
public natural resources to safeguard the people’s right 
to a healthy environment; and 
• provide for any person to enforce the right against the 
State and its subdivisions through appropriate legal 
proceedings. 
 
Together, these principles, which are explained in further 
detail below, can be used to develop a constitutional 
environmental right that provides meaningful protection to 
citizens and direction to courts and legislators as New York 
navigates modern environmental challenges.  A right 
incorporating these principles would invite a judicial oversight 
role and provide the judiciary with sufficient guidance to enable 
courts to meaningfully engage while defining and limiting the 
scope of judicial involvement so as to prevent undue 
encroachment on the legislature’s policymaking role. 
 
Ecosystem frame 
 
Our recommendation to index a healthy environment to 
resilient and diverse ecosystems reflects a recognition of our 
embeddedness in and reliance on and impact upon natural 
systems.  This recognition will be important as we seek to 
achieve sustainability and prepare for and navigate the impacts 
of climate change.  It also reflects an understanding of the 
relationship between nature and man that accommodates both 
anthropocentric values (the services that ecosystems provide 
that advance human well-being) and inherent existence values, 
including the value of diverse species. 
Since the 1970s “growth vs. conservation” has been a 
recurring dilemma.  The goal should be to balance the market’s 
appetite for “resources” within appropriate parameters.  We can 
see that the law we have developed is not preventing the 
disintegration of many ecosystems.  Climate change and low-
level chemical exposures are two examples.  There is a 
disjunction between our legal expectations and ecological 
27
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reality.  The fate of our essential ecological infrastructure is 
uncertain and the legal response not yet adequate.68 
Meanwhile, ecology and its constituent sciences and tools 
are developing rapidly.  One suggestion for the law that has 
emerged from ecological studies is that we supplement use of the 
term “environmental” with the more concrete term(s), 
“ecological” or “ecosystem.”  While the “environment” is abstract, 
ecosystems are physical, local, and temporal.  An ecosystem can 
be mapped and studied.  Ecological terminology, frameworks 
and principles can assist the legal system in protecting the 
actual environment.69 
Professionals in ecology and related disciplines are 
considering how best to manage and preserve ecosystems so that 
their functional integrity is supported and maintained.  The 
literature on ecosystem services, ecological integrity and 
sustainability presents new possibilities and reveals the sources 
of risks we are recognizing now.  An important step to 
addressing these risks should be to acknowledge (or strengthen) 
the connection between ecosystems and those who live in them, 
to recognize a grounded legal basis for the inhabitants of 
ecosystems to participate in its protection. 
 
Public trust 
 
We recommend indexing the constitutional right to a 
healthy environment to a government trust obligation.  The 
concept of environmental public trust is historical and familiar, 
but also dynamic and flexible.70  In New York, the common law 
 
68.  Johan Rockström & Mattias Klum, BIG WORLD, SMALL PLANET: 
ABUNDANCE WITHIN PLANETARY BOUNDARIES 64-77 (2015) (identifying key 
planetary boundaries). 
69.  The term “ecosystem” refers to the manner or process of how nature 
constitutes itself, creating the infrastructure we rely upon.  The Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment defined ecosystem services broadly as “the benefits 
people obtain from ecosystems. These include provisioning services such as 
food, water, timber, and fiber; regulating services that affect climate, floods, 
disease, wastes, and water quality; cultural services that provide recreational, 
aesthetic, and spiritual benefits; and supporting services such as soil 
formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling.” MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM 
ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
ASSESSMENT 49, 54-55 (2003). 
70.  See Mary Christina Wood, NATURE’S TRUST – ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
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public trust doctrine protects uses of navigable waters and has 
been extended to safeguard municipal and State parks from 
being alienated or converted to nonpublic use, to preserve 
forests, and to protect historic sites.71  The concept of treating 
environmental resources as a public trust is likewise reflected in 
New York statutes.72  Grounding a constitutional environmental 
right in traditional public trust concepts thus provides a 
grounding for judicial interpretation.  We fear that judicial 
reluctance to elaborate on a bare assertion of a right to a healthy 
environment would result in such a provision laying fallow. 
Public trust principles can, moreover, guide government 
response to emerging environmental challenges, like climate 
change, that require grappling with aggregated harms, future 
impacts and questions about long term sustainability.  The 
public trust doctrine articulates the existence of some outer 
limits on private use of natural resources and it reaffirms the 
democratic goal of broad access to meet the people’s common and 
long term needs and opportunities. 
One concern expressed about the creation of a constitutional 
environmental right is its potential to impact private property 
rights.  We would recommend making an environmental right 
self-executing only as against the State with respect to 
satisfaction of its public trust duty.  As such, it could not be 
relied upon to bring suit directly against the owner of private 
property.  Of course, it is possible that in fulfilling its public trust 
duty to conserve and protect public natural resources to protect 
the constitutional environmental right the government may 
adopt laws and regulations that restrict private activity. It is 
 
FOR A NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE (Cambridge 2014). 
71.  Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of N.Y., 95 N.Y.2d 623 (2001) 
(stating that “our courts have time and again reaffirmed the principle that 
parkland is impressed with a public trust, requiring legislative approval before 
it can be alienated. . .for non-park purposes.”); Town of North Elba v. 
Grimditch, 98 A.D.2d 183, 188 (3d Dep’t 2012). 
72.  See N.Y. Parks Rec. & Hist Preserve Law § 3.0l (protecting State 
owned parkland throughout the State); N.Y. Parks Rec & Hist Preserve Law 
§ 19.05 (safeguarding historic sites as parks to be protected); N.Y. Envtl. 
Conservation Law, §15-1601 (McKinney 2011) (declaring that “all the waters 
of the state are valuable public natural resources held in public trust. . .and 
this state has a duty as trustee to manage its waters effectively for the use and 
enjoyment of present and future residents and for the protection of the 
environment.”). 
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important to note, however, that these actions can just as well 
be expected to enhance private property rights by promoting 
environmental conditions that improve the enjoyment and value 
of property. 
Concerns might be raised that constitutional affirmation 
that public natural resources are held as a public trust might 
prevent private property owners from obtaining just 
compensation through a regulatory takings claim.  A vested 
property right is a precondition for a regulatory takings claim 
and for purposes of the Takings Clause, property is defined with 
respect to “the restrictions that background principles of the 
[s]tate’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land 
ownership.”73  Thus, a property owner cannot obtain just 
compensation where background principles of state property or 
nuisance law (including, possibly, the public trust doctrine) 
already limit the scope of the property right in the manner of the 
challenged regulation.74  Notably, “[g]overnment defendants 
have successfully raised the public trust doctrine as a defense in 
a number of takings cases across the country, particularly those 
involving submerged lands,” although whether and under what 
circumstances the public trust doctrine qualifies as a 
background principle that will defeat a takings claim remains 
unsettled.75 
We think it unlikely that constitutional assertion that 
public natural resources constitute a public trust will 
significantly impact private property owners’ opportunities to 
obtain just compensation.  It is unclear whether a constitutional 
assertion of public trust would be deemed a relevant background 
principle.  Moreover, in many cases, the public trust will overlap 
with other recognized background principles that limit the use 
of property, such as the exercise of police powers or the 
prerogative to intervene to prevent private property from being 
used in a manner that unreasonably interferes with the rights 
of others, which already forestall takings claims.  And, as 
recently reiterated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Murr v. 
Wisconsin, whether a regulatory taking has occurred typically 
 
73.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).  
74.  Id. 
75.  John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine As A Background 
Principles Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931, 934 (2012). 
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depends upon the particular facts.76  We thus do not believe that 
there is significant risk that articulation of a constitutional 
public trust and associated duty relating to public natural 
resources would unduly affect the rights of private property 
owners. 
 
Enforcement 
 
To be effective, the environmental right should be self-
executing by providing for any person to enforce the right 
against the State and its subdivisions through appropriate legal 
proceedings.  As discussed at length above, absent such an 
enforcement mechanism, the right may lay fallow and provide 
little value.  Additionally, allowing for citizen enforcement 
should not occasion undue judicial aggrandizement.  One 
important question raised, however, in structuring a provision 
to allow for enforcement of the right by citizens against the State 
is which entities are subject to the duties and responsibilities 
created by the right and subject to suit.  In short, how should the 
State and its subdivisions be defined and understood?77 
It would be inadequate to limit suits to actions directly 
against the New York State Legislature.  Actions and decisions 
with significant impacts on the State’s environment and natural 
resources are commonly undertaken by a multitude of 
government actors.  Having looked to New York statutes which 
address obligations of government for guidance,78 the Task Force 
 
76.  Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S.Ct. 1933,  (“A central dynamic of the Court’s 
regulatory takings jurisprudence, then, is its flexibility. . . . In adjudicating 
regulatory takings cases a proper balancing of these principles requires a 
careful inquiry informed by the specifics of the case.”). 
77.  Other states’ environmental right provisions vary as to who is covered 
and who can initiate enforcement.  In Pennsylvania, for example, the 
constitutional text places the duty on the “Commonwealth,” which courts have 
interpreted to include “all levels of government in the Commonwealth.”  
Franklin Twp. v. Com., Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 500 Pa. 1, 8–9, 452 A.2d 718, 722 
(1982).  In Hawai’i, public natural resources are held in trust by “the State,” 
the “State and its political subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawai’i’s 
natural beauty and all natural resources,” and the right to a clean and 
healthful environment is enforceable by “[a]ny person . . . against any party, 
public or private. . .”  HRS Const. Art. XI, §§ 1, 9.   
78.  Specifically, the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) 
the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) as well as the State Administrative 
Procedures Act (SAPA) and some provisions of the criminal laws all in some 
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recommends that the right extend to and be enforceable against 
the sovereign State of New York, defined as the State, its 
counties, and chartered municipalities including with the 
broadest interpretation possible all administrative and 
legislative bodies, all municipal instrumentalities including 
without limitation public authorities chartered by the State 
together with individuals, boards, cooperatives or organization 
empowered with any authority through the sovereign power of 
the State. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons described above, the Task Force 
recommends that (I) no changes be made to Article XIV; and (II) 
Article I be amended to set forth an environmental right.  Article 
XIV provides a great value to the citizens of New York and 
should be maintained in its integrity.  Article XIV is not, 
however, adequate in scope to meet today’s pressing and 
unprecedented environmental challenges.  Indeed, the 
ecosystems within the Forest Preserve cannot be protected in 
the long term without decisive action to respond to climate 
change. 
We also, therefore, recommend that the New York State 
Constitution clearly articulate and provide a means for citizens 
to insist upon respect for core environmental principles through 
the addition of an environmental right.  In some respects, these 
principles are so fundamental that they can understood to be a 
condition of sovereignty, part of our social compact.  All too often, 
however, the continued existence of resilient ecosystems capable 
of supporting and enriching life is assumed and the threats to 
the same are invisible in their proliferation and diffusion.  As we 
confront existential questions of sustainability and the human 
impact on life systems, there is value in stating a right 
understood to exist—that New Yorkers have a right to an 
environment capable of supporting and sustaining life—and 
 
way mandate that government function in service to citizens. As such the 
statutes were crafted to encompass various subsets of government actors.  
None of the statutes is specifically broad or focused enough to provide language 
that can be co-opted in whole for use in an environmental right but the 
statutes’ definitions are instructive. 
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providing a means for citizens and the judiciary to protect it. 
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